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Abstract: The aim of this article is to verify whether the creation of safe assets 
(sovereign bond-backed securities, SBBS) proposed in 2012 by the so-called group of 
‘euro-nomics’ is a way to promote financial safety and risk-sharing in the EMU. In 
particular, attention is given to the shortcomings associated with the process of 
securitization. This is important, because securitization was, prior to the subprime 
crisis, considered an innovative means of increasing safety in private debt markets. 
The question is whether sovereign debt is a candidate for securitization and, if so, 
what implications this carries over to the debt structure itself and respective 
contractual design. My conclusion is that the creation of SBBS really implies a 
‘privatization’ of sovereign debt, with advantages to the functioning of financial 
markets in ‘normal’ times but with possible insufficiencies in moments of financial 
distress. Moreover, lessons from the subprime crisis should not be forgotten. 
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Introduction  
In the aftermath of the Euro area (sovereign debt) crisis, proposals and roadmaps for 
EMU reforms have multiplied both on an institutional basis (at the EU level) as well 
as stemming from academia and think tanks. Amongst such proposals, the institution 
of a safe asset has gained momentum in the last few years, as an alternative to the 
institution of Eurobonds (advocated initially by De Grauwe and Mosen, 2009 and 
popularized with the ‘blue/red bonds’ proposal by Delpla and von Weizsäcker, 2010). 
The fact is that, since the beginning, the institution of Eurobonds faced political 
resistance as it was accused of promoting institutional moral hazard and of 
jeopardizing fiscal discipline in EMU countries, especially those with a worse fiscal 
track-record. 
On the other hand, a safe asset is presented as a way to overcome the so-called ‘safety 
trilemma’ faced by the EMU, according to which one of these goals has to be 
dropped: euro area stability; open capital market; and national safe haven (Riet, 
2017).  
For the proponents of the creation of safe assets (the ‘euro-nomics group’),1 these are 
a way to overcome the ‘financial trilemma’, where a national safe haven gives way to 
a euro one, thereby restoring safety in (EMU’s) debt markets. In particular, the safe 
																																																								
1 Brunnermeier et al. (2012, 2016). Subsequently, in 2016, the European Systemic 
Risk Board (ESRB) commissioned a High-Level Task Force on Safe Assets, chaired 
by Philip R. Lane, to investigate the practical considerations relating to sovereign 
bond-backed securities (SBBS). The final Report is here referred to as ESRB (2018). 
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asset2 would be able to cope with two problems inherited from the Euro crisis: i) 
‘Doom-looping’ between sovereign and banking debts; ii) The flight of capital to a 
national safe haven in the event of distress. In fact, the safe asset would give banks an 
alternative to sovereign bonds and the flight of capital to a ‘safe haven’ would no 
longer be across borders, but across different financial instruments issued at the 
European level (Brunnermeier at al., 2012). 
 
1. Securitization and the memory of the subprime crisis  
Although several complex causes can be merged to explain the subprime bubble – e.g. 
the interaction between economic expansion and easy access to credit with financial 
deregulation and a permissive monetary policy – a usual frontline reason arises: the 
subprime crisis was mostly related to undue consequences of financial innovation, 
and in particular of the development of securitization techniques.     
Indeed, the financial system has suffered major innovations since the late 1980s 
onwards. Haan et al. (2012, pp. 29-33) identify two main changes. Firstly, the 
traditional banking model, in which the issuing banks holding loans until they are 
repaid (the originate-to-hold model) was replaced by the originate-to-distribute, OTD 
model. In this model, banks pool loans (e.g. mortgages) and then tranche them and 
sell them via securitization. Secondly, this securitization has in turn led to a non-
regulated shadow banking system, made to support the characteristic bank function of 
maturity transformation outside banks – through off-balance sheet vehicles, e.g. 
conduits and special purpose vehicles, SPVs (Haan et al., 2012). 
																																																								
2 A safe asset is “a marketable financial claim on public or private sector entities that 
investors consider to offer a convenience yield because of its special attributes in 
terms of moneyness, liquidity, volatility and in particular its safety” (Riet, 2017). 
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The main consequences of financial innovation are that they can improve payments, 
savings and investment opportunities and may increase risk sharing (Haan et al., 
2012, p. 227). Notwithstanding that, this evolution also suggests that even though 
there are far more participants able to absorb the risks, the financial risks meanwhile 
created by the system are indeed of greater magnitude (Rajan, 2005, p. 4).  
 
A good synthesis of the initial events of the subprime crisis can be found in Bullard et 
al. (2009, pp. 404-406). In the U.S. during the housing boom of the 1990s/2000s, a 
rapid rise in the sharing of nonprime loans took place, especially mortgage loans with 
unconventional terms (e.g. adjustable interest rates). Many of these borrowers were 
homebuyers with a weak credit performance including low income-to-loan ratios. The 
amount of nonprime loans sold by the lenders to other financial institutions also 
increased sharply, through the development of the market for mortgage-backed 
securities (MBSs).  
These MBSs, based on pools of mortgage loans allowed for the redistribution of the 
income stream from the underlying mortgage pool among bonds that differ by the 
seniority of their claims (Bullard et al., 2009, p. 406). Sometimes, additional 
securities – collateralized debt obligations, CDOs – were created by combining 
several MBS and which were then sold by tranches to investors with different 
appetites for risk (Ibidem, p. 406).  
Therefore, while house prices rose, mortgages performed well; when houses prices 
began to decline, borrowers discovered that they owed more than the value of the 
house they had bought. Consequently, from 2006 onwards, loan defaults began to rise 
steadily, which ultimately caused related MBS and CDO defaults as well (Bullard et 
al., 2009, p. 406).  
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As mentioned by Hellwig (2009, pp. 7-8), securitization has been at the origin of the 
crisis, coupled with a specific feature of housing and real-estate finance – the maturity 
mismatch or the discrepancy between the long economic lifetime of these assets and 
the investment horizons of the investors, usually of a much shorter duration.   
Hellwig (2009, pp. 11-14) notes then that the development of a system of real estate 
finance based on MBS (the heart of securitization) was justified by three main 
reasons: (i) Firstly, securitization permits the originating institution and the debtor to 
shift away the risk to other market participants in better conditions to bear it; (ii) 
Secondly, the marketing of these securities should also enable better international risk 
allocation; (iii) Thirdly, the formation of packages, in itself, makes economic sense, 
since this is supposed to mitigate information problems, and therefore to promote risk 
sharing between investors.  
If, by itself, securitization is a way to cope with maturity mismatch and to ensure 
liquidity in certain financial markets, thereby seeking to increase the efficiency (and 
safety) of those financial markets, the problematic way securitization evolved, 
together with the subprime bubble, explain the eruption of the subprime crisis.  
The first problem was that most of the MBSs did not enter insurance company or 
pension fund portfolios (i.e. of regulated institutions) but highly leveraged institutions 
that were engaged in substantial maturity transformation and in constant need of 
refinancing, and not subject to any kind of regulatory requirement.  
The second problem was that the basis of the securitization chain was the 
deterioration of credit quality, conducive to weak performing loans, and securitization 
was meant precisely to dilute the risks and consequences of this burden on bank 
balance sheets.  
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And yet, paradoxically (as a third problem), unlike what should have happened in a 
pure OTD model, securitization did not mean that credit-originating institutions really 
transferred credit risks to market investors. Banks retained most of the risk across a 
variety of instruments, notably, through tranching and the creation of CDOs (Acharya 
et al. 2009a, p. 21). Jaffee et al. (2009, p. 71) state: “the financial crisis occurred 
because financial institutions did not follow the business model of securitization. 
Rather than acting as intermediaries by transferring the risk from mortgage lenders to 
capital market investors, they became investors. They put ‘skin in the game’”.  
Another important feature of the securitization process was the link to swap 
instruments (derivatives) – e.g. ‘credit default swaps, CDSs’. This relation is in 
principle justified by these reasons (Acharya et al. 2009b, pp. 233-234): i) Risk 
management; ii) Price discovery (derivatives allow market participants to extract 
forward-looking information about the functioning of the market); iii) Liquidity - 
either by bringing the market additional players to the market or by providing a hedge 
to market makers, reducing transaction costs. Derivatives face, however, several 
drawbacks, the most important of which is the complexity and lack of transparency 
within the system, notably when these derivatives are traded ‘over-the-counter, OTC’ 
(Ibidem, p. 235).  
 
The purpose of this initial description was thus to shed light on the main features of 
securitization in the subprime mortgage market (which is a private debt market) and 
the main problems related to the implementation of its business model. This is 
important when it comes to verifying whether the justification for securitization given 
by them in this market exists today for the case of the sovereign debt market, that is, 
to identify similarities and differences between the two types of markets. Most of all, 
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I intent to highlight the problems - to be avoided - in the implementation of the new 
‘safe assets’ keeping fully in mind the memory of the subprime crisis, its triggers and 
effects.  
I will start that reflection by analyzing the differences in the structure of public debt 
when compared with private debt, and in particular with corporate debt.   
 
2. The different structure of public debt in comparison to private corporate debt 
As noted by the IMF (2004), sovereign liability structures are not as rich as those of 
the corporations. There are two main reasons for such different structures. 
The first reason is that much of the financial structure in private companies is based 
on equity (stocks) or equity-like instruments, such as convertibles (e.g. bonds that can 
be converted into stocks at a pre-determined date at a certain exchange rate) or 
contingent convertibles (the conversion occurs when certain events occur). Whenever 
the financial structure is based on these kinds of instruments, investors share fortunes 
and misfortunes suffered by the company.  
Unlike private debt, in the case of sovereign debt, the financial structure does not 
incorporate this kind of risk-sharing mechanism that underlies a structure based on 
equity (debtors are outsiders with respect to the financial structure). On the other 
hand, we are dealing with incomplete contracts, because the repayment cannot be 
made contingent on the realized level of output (Bolton and Jeanne, 2008). Although 
renegotiation can involve some ex-post state contingency, the fact is that it tends to be 
a lengthy and costly process (Aguiar and Amador, 2013). Debt restructuring in 
particular may involve borrowing and signalling costs, along with reputational issues. 
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The inexistence of these equity instruments – working as risk-sharing mechanisms 
within the company’s financial structure  – can however be overcome in the sovereign 
debt financial structure. As mentioned by the IMF (2004), the benefits of risk-sharing 
can be mimicked through financial instruments with payment terms indexed to real 
variables, such as gross domestic product (GDP).3 
Payoff structures of GDP-indexed bonds link the size of interest payments to the 
issuing country’s rate of economic growth (Ahrend et al. 2011): higher interest rates 
in good times and lower rates in moments of economic downturn. GDP-indexed 
bonds can reduce the likelihood of debt crises, acting as an automatic stabilizer 
against pro-cyclical spending: when countries are hit by a negative macroeconomic 
shock, the lower interest payments reduce the need for fiscal adjustment (austerity) or 
additional and costly borrowing (Ahrend et al., 2011).   
However, despite these properties of GDP-indexed bonds, shortcomings still remain 
(Ahrend et al., 2011). For lenders, the absence of a liquid secondary market for such 
bonds can be problematic. Moral hazard can also be a source of concern and issuing 
governments may be tempted to manipulate statistics in order to reduce their 
payments with interests. On the other hand, from the borrowers’ perspective, paying 
an insurance premium (i.e. higher interest rates) during periods of strong economic 
growth can be considered as politically unacceptable (Ahrend et al., 2011). 
In short, as noted by Blanchard et al. (2016), growth-indexed bonds have two effects 
on debt dynamics: on the one hand, they decrease the upper tail of the distribution of 
the debt ratio; but, on the other hand, they may also require a premium (to cope with 
default, novelty and liquidity risks), which may lead to a worse baseline and offset the 
first effect.  
																																																								
3 See the seminal contribution from Shiller (1993). 
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The second reason that justifies differences of structure between private and sovereign 
debt relates to the inexistence, in the latter, of an explicit seniority structure, which at 
the corporate level is naturally required by statute or through bond covenants (IMF, 
2004). This is indeed the second reason why we are dealing with incomplete 
contracts: the repayment of the first lender cannot be made contingent on the contract 
with the second lender (Bolton and Jeanne, 2008).  
As a result, sovereign creditors are more exposed to ‘debt dilution’ than are their 
corporate counterparts: “Debt dilution occurs when new debt reduces the claim that 
existing creditors can hope to recover in the event of default” (IMF, 2004, p. 7). As a 
reaction to debt dilution, investors may tend to impose de facto forms of seniority, 
such as the replacement of long-term by short-term debt and/or by debt that is more 
difficult to restructure. This option involves, in turn, serious dangers for the borrower 
counterpart, including increasing borrowing costs. Note that, in principle, short-term 
debt makes governments more vulnerable to debt rollover crises: in the extreme case, 
creditors stop lending to the government simply as they expect others to do the same; 
if the average maturity of debt is low, the government will be at the mercy of self-
fulfilling creditor panics that can be triggered by shifts in market sentiment (IMF, 
2004, p. 24).      
Moreover, corporations issue liabilities belonging to several classes with different 
priority in the event of liquidation or bankruptcy: secured debt; ordinary unsecured 
debt; subordinated debt; preferred stock; common stock (IMF, 2004, p. 22). 
Additionally, corporations make extensive use of securitization, through structured 
financing (e.g. collateralized debt), as a way to meet liquidity needs and assign risks 
related to maturity mismatching to other institutions (e.g. SPV) more appropriate to 
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assume such risks. In contrast, sovereign liabilities usually fall into one single class  
(unsecured debt) and the secured debt is residual, where sovereign claims are 
collateralized by future receipts - e.g. oil revenue or other exportable receivables 
(IMF, 2004). 
To cope with this peculiar structure, several proposals have been made advocating the 
introduction, on the one hand, of explicit mechanisms of seniority and, on the other 
hand, more diversified classes of secured and unsecured debt, including in-between 
classes.  
As for the former suggestion, Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2015) explain that an explicit 
seniority structure within debt can mitigate the dilution problem (e.g. the shift towards 
short-term debt), because existing creditors do not have to share default payments 
with new creditors. At the same time, seniority could curb over-borrowing for 
politically biased countries with excessive borrowing and at the same time reduce the 
costs of borrowing for countries with low levels of debt (IMF, 2004). 
Even if the introduction of explicit seniority reveals unfeasible, analogous, implicit 
forms can be introduced, in order to protect the financial interests of creditors by 
restricting the borrowing’s financial decisions. This is the case with (negative) 
covenants,4 that is, quantitative fiscal rules limiting budget deficits or placing limits 
on (external) debt (IMF, 2004, p. 23) and eventually expenditure ceilings.  
																																																								
4 Note that covenants (in the corporate financing structure) can be either positive or 
negative, in the event of involving, respectively, impositions or prohibitions on the 
debtor. Negative covenants – the most common – can include, for example, clauses 
implying limits to indebtedness or borrowing, restrictions on the distribution of 
dividends, negative pledge clauses, restrictions on investment, mergers prohibition, 
etc. 
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In turn, the introduction of new forms of secured sovereign debt can be conceived: on 
the one hand, fiscal buffers fed by tax revenues obtained at good moments of the 
cycle; on the other hand, the constitution of debt reserves (e.g. deposits) based on 
prudent debt management, including the debt rollover and debt issuing in good times 
(e.g. low interest rates) to ensure reserves to meet financial needs in times of distress.  
Moreover, processes of securitization, relying on structured financing, are not out of 
sight. Indeed, public debt is, in principle, also a plausible candidate for securitization, 
in particular for the creation of CDOs involving tranching and the definition of 
different degrees of seniority (e.g. senior, mezzanine and junior tranches). Safe assets 
– in their various forms to be analysed in the following sections - correspond 
precisely to this attempt to ‘securitize’ the public debt market. 
For the time being, see Table 1, which summarizes the way the structure of sovereign 
debt can therefore be approximated to the structure of corporate debt. 
 
Table 1 - Approximating the structure of sovereign debt to the structure of private debt  
 
Elements of debt structure Corporate private debt Sovereign (public) debt 
(mimicking private debt) 
Equity base for financing Equity or equity-based 
instruments (e.g. 
convertibles) 
GDP-indexed bonds 
Seniority  Explicit seniority: 
(i) Statutory seniority or (ii) 
Driven by covenants 
Explicit or implicit seniority 
(to cope with unwanted de 
facto seniority): 
- Explicit: contractual 
seniority; 
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- Implicit: negative covenants 
(fiscal rules: deficit, debt or 
expenditure limits).  
 
Secured/unsecured  
 
 
 
 
Different classes of financing 
(secured and unsecured) 
 
 
New classes of (implicit) 
secured debt: 
(i) Fiscal buffers and 
(ii) Debt reserves. 
The role of securitization and 
hedging 
The reliance on structured 
finance (e.g. CDOs) 
The use of derivatives (e.g. 
CDS) 
Safe Assets (SBBS) 
  
Source: the Author (2019) 
 
 
3. Debt restructuring as the ‘natural’ response for sovereign debt crisis and yet 
difficult to obtain
5 
The different structure of public debt in comparison to private debt implies 
differences from the debt management point of view. In particular, in the case of a 
debt crisis, debt restructuring is the ‘natural’ outcome. In fact, unlike what happens in 
the case of a private company bankruptcy, where the insolvency mechanism is an 
asset liquidation type, in the case of insolvent governments the mechanism is 
generally of a reorganization type: debt restructuring lies at the heart of any 
insolvency framework (Liu and Waibel, 2008).  
																																																								
5	For	further	development	on	this	issue,	Cabral	(2020).	
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In fact, the Greek case constitutes an example of a ‘muscled’ decision of sovereign 
debt restructuring in the course of the Euro crisis. Prior to the Second Adjustment 
Programme (2012), the Eurogroup decided to promote Greek’s debt restructuring, in 
order to prevent a selective default. In the words of Xafa (2014), “the 2012 Greek 
debt exchange and subsequent buyback was (…) the largest debt restructuring in the 
history of sovereign defaults, and the first within the Eurozone.”6 
   
Although debt restructuring can be seen as a natural response for public debt, the fact 
is that, as noted by Bolton and Jeanne (2008), the structure of sovereign debt is 
usually designed to make debt-restructuring more difficult. In fact, with the debt 
crises of the 1980s that affected several emerging economies, the so-called 
‘willingness-to-pay problem’ was highlighted: a policy intervention that aims to 
reduce the costs of restructuring sovereign debt, while improving ex-post efficiency, 
will undermine ex-ante efficiency by raising the cost of borrowing and reducing the 
amount of lending available (Bolton and Jeanne, 2008). As also noted, the shift 
verified since the 1980s from bank loans to bonds in sovereign finance is partially 
explained by the fact that investors see bonds as more secure than bank loans, simply 
because the former are more difficult to restructure (Idem, 2008). This also explains 
why orderly mechanisms for debt restructuring have faced so much resistance and are 
usually seen as a way to weaken enforcement mechanisms within debt contracts and 
to attack the contractual equilibrium and the fair treatment of creditors. 
In fact, all the attempts to frame, on a multilateral basis, debt restructuring processes, 
per se or enclosed in a package of financial assistance (as were/are the programmes 
provided by the IMF) have been only moderately successful. It was the case with the 
																																																								
6 For more details on this haircut, see Zettelmeyer et al. (2013) and Cabo (2017). 
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proposal for the institution of ‘Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanisms’ (SDRM), 
made under the auspices of the IMF in the mid-1990s This proposal can be qualified, 
on the other hand, as a nuanced version of the market-based approach of debt 
restructuring with features of the statutory approach.  
The market-based approach relies mostly on the so-called ‘Collective Action Clauses’ 
(CACs). As explained by Guzman and Stiglitz (2014), at the origin of these clauses 
(in the mid-1990s) was the intention of the International Capital Market Association 
(ICMA), supported by the IMF, to change the language of debt contracts. CACs are 
meant to allow bondholders across different series of bonds to vote collectively in 
response to a restructuring proposal, and the decisions of a super-majority would be 
binding to all the bondholders across all series.  
Despite the good intentions behind this approach, Guzman and Stiglitz (2014) 
consider that it is not sufficient to address the current problems that the restructuring 
process faces, notably the blockage veto from vulture funds,7 the prevention of unjust 
enrichment and the existence of distortive CDSs.  
In a similar vein, Berensmann (2011, p. 197) identifies three main problems to the 
CAC approach. Firstly, the rush to the exit problem, that occurs if the creditors fear 
that a debtor may be heading for a debt crisis, in which case they will seek to sell their 
claims. Secondly, the rush to the courthouse problem that leads creditor to take legal 
action to recover their claims, in the event of default, resulting in a fall in the value of 
the assets concerned, which can be detrimental to all creditors involved, Finally, the 
																																																								
7 Guzman and Stiglitz (2014) recalling the Argentine case in the 1990s, stress that the 
disruption of the restructuring process was due to the judicial action taken by ‘vulture 
funds’ that had bought defaulted assets (debt) and then demanded full payment, 
blocking the super-majority pro-restructuring assumed in the CAC. 
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holdout problem, where a minority of creditors can block a debt restructuring process 
that could be advantageous to the majority of the creditors. On this latter aspect, the 
Greek case (together with the aforementioned Argentine episode) is also illustrative. 
Here, the holdout problem was not entirely overcome. In fact, while the 
abovementioned CACs ensured that the entire Greek-law bonds were exchanged, 
some holders of foreign-law bonds decided to hold out for full payment (Xafa, 2014). 
To avoid an Argentine-style litigation, holdout creditors were paid in full (Xafa, 
2014). 
 
Alternative models to the market-based approach have been advocated. The proposal 
made by Guzman and Stiglitz (2014) for the implementation of a (multinational) legal 
framework for sovereign debt restructuring is an illustration of what can be qualified 
as a statutory approach. Here, we are no longer uniquely facing a 
contractual/voluntary framework for debt restructuring. We are assuming the 
codification of principles, the settlement of multilateral legal rules and possibly the 
institution of super partes multilateral courts (or arbitration courts) assigned with the 
task of adjudicating a restructuring decision involving the sovereign debtor and (all 
of) its creditors. 
The evolution from a typical market-based approach to a statutory approach mostly 
depends on the nature of the creditors and on the type of relationship that exists 
between them, including spillovers or contagion effects. Indeed, the departure point 
for the implementation of an ordered (and eventually centralized) plan for debt 
restructuring is the recognition that restructuring is a ‘lesser evil’, when the alternative 
is a disorderly default that can result in not only severe reputational consequences for 
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the defaulter,8 but also severe contagion effects (first and foremost to the lenders 
themselves). The restructuring plan that was presented to Greece reflects the risks that 
other EMU countries (including the respective financial and banking sector) faced in 
the event Greece failed to meet all its obligations vis-à-vis its lenders at the time.  
Debt restructuring is also related to the nature of creditors: in principle, the more 
disseminated the debt holding is (through a plurality of bondholders), the more 
securitized (e.g. bonds instead of loan contracts), and the more it is held by private 
instead of ‘official’ creditors, the more difficult it is to agree and succeed with a debt 
restructuring process.9 On the other hand, debt restructuring can also imply a shift in 
the debt structure and a replacement of typical private, by institutional, official debt, 
particularly when it is coupled with financial assistance programmes. The Greek case 
after the restructuring is again illustrative, where the major lenders became the IMF 
and the EU. 
It is not accidental that several proposals – within the reform of EMU’s fiscal 
governance - made in recent years include measures for orderly debt restructuring. 
They take into account that future restructuring will be asked to countries (already) in 
																																																								
8 Note that sovereigns seldom default on their debts (Rogoff and Bulow, 1988), and 
this is explained by several reasons. Indeed, considering historical examples, default 
countries can suffer sanctions, either explicit sanctions - e.g. trade retaliation, fiscal 
house arrest and military reaction - or implicit sanctions (on reputational grounds), 
e.g. increasing borrowing costs that ultimately can prevent indebted countries from 
having access to financing markets. 
9 Eaton and Fernandez (1995) highlight that in the presence of multiple creditors, the 
problem is not just of coordination amongst them, but also the so-called heterogeneity 
problem. In particular, small lenders have greater incentives to free ride.     
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fiscal distress, as some peripheral countries are. As noted previously, most of these 
countries – such as Greece and Portugal – have as their main creditors, official 
creditors (that is, the ‘Troika’ members) and not, as until the crisis, private creditors. 
So, assuming as a possibility, future financial bailouts through the existing 
mechanisms (in particular the European Stability Mechanism, ESM), it is expectable 
to assume debt restructuring as an element of the package for that same assistance.  
The most radical and fully centralized debt restructuring proposal (to solve the EMU 
sovereign debt crisis) was presented by a group of economists led by Pâris and 
Wyplosz (2014): the proposal was coined as the PADRE plan. This plan can be 
qualified as the ultimate version of the statutory approach, because it does not only 
include the centralized design of legal rules for debt restructuring (around which 
creditors should agree), but also a centralized management of the restructured debt 
(possibly he ECB itself).  
 
4. Models of debt issuing in the EMU: from debt mutualisation to debt 
securitization
10
  
E(M)U is far from having a euro area fiscal authority or a Treasury able to issue ‘risk-
free’ Eurobonds, based on a joint and several guarantee from all participating 
countries (Riet, 2017). Initial proposals for debt issuing at the E(M)U level involved 
some kind of mutualisation (debt pooling), that is, some kind of mutual guarantee at 
the central level.  
Within this mutualisation model – also known as Eurobonds - the most noteworthy 
proposal, amongst several others, was the one made by Delpla and von Weizsäcker 
(2010). The proposal relied on two categories of bonds: a blue and a red bond. The 
																																																								
10	For	further	development	on	this	issue,	Cabral	(2020).	
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former would correspond - up to 60 percent of GDP of each Member State’s national 
debt – to a joint senior sovereign debt, with reduced borrowing costs. The latter would 
correspond to any additional debt beyond the threshold and would be issued as 
national junior debt, with a procedure for orderly debt default. In this case, the 
increasing marginal cost of public borrowing would help to enhance fiscal discipline 
(Idem, 2010).  
Matziorinis (2011) detailed the main advantages for the creation of Eurobonds. 
Firstly, they would immediately resolve the euro debt crisis – a common debt 
instrument backed by all euro area countries would lead yields to fall significantly 
(Matziorinis, 2011). Secondly, by reducing the interest rate, such new bonds would 
save governments considerable amounts of interest payments, thereby reducing future 
budget deficits and improving debt sustainability in the long run. Thirdly, such an 
instrument would reduce the degree to which peripheral countries would need to 
apply austerity measures, reducing the risk of economic recession. Fourthly, it would 
transform the currently fragmented European financial market for sovereign bonds 
into one single and vast European bond market.  Fifth, the Eurobonds would help to 
strengthen the role of the euro as a global reserve asset and currency (Idem, 2011).  
However, as also noted by the same author, the creation of these types of bonds was 
not without disadvantages (Matziorinis, 2011). The first was that it might raise the 
interest rates of the most creditworthy countries, in particular those paid by Germany. 
Secondly, such a bond might remove the disciplining effect of capital markets on the 
ability of member states to issue more debt and would institutionalize moral hazard. 
 
Due to the political resistance faced by these debt-pooling approaches (mostly related 
with the problem of moral hazard), more recent proposals dispense with this feature 
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and rely on the simple idea of making those sovereign assets safer (Lannoo and 
Thomadakis, 2019, p. 31).  
As noted in this regard by Brunnermeier at al. (2012), modern financial systems rely 
heavily on safe assets. As such, prudent bank regulation – in line with Basel Accords 
– requires banks to manage the risk in their assets in proportion to their capital. 
Pension funds are another example of a large class of investors that must hold a 
significant share of safe assets (Brunnermeier at al., 2012). The fact is that, unlike the 
U.S. Treasury bonds, Europe lacks a ‘national’ safe asset and the equal treatment of 
all national government bonds as safe, prior to the crisis, has shown itself to be 
counterproductive.   
 
5. The main features of sovereign bond-backed securities (SBBS) 
5.1. Designing features of the SBBS; comparison with other types of bonds 
Considering this background, Brunnermeier et al. (2012) then proposed the creation 
of a new class of synthetic bonds – the SBBS – initially labelled as European Safe 
Bonds (ESBies): they are European, because they are issued by a European Debt 
Agency (EDA) in line with the EU Treaty; they are safe, by being designed to 
minimize the risk of default; they are bonds, because freely traded in markets and held 
by investors and central banks.   
The idea is to use the techniques of securitization, diversification and tranching to 
engineer an instrument with an extra safety and liquidity premium in the market, 
without involving debt mutualisation (Riet, 2017). In fact, such bonds combine 
elements of sovereign bonds, securitized bonds and covered bonds (ESRB, 2018): i) 
They are like sovereign bonds, because cash flows that accrue from these SBBS 
derive exclusively from the underlying sovereign bonds; ii) They are like securitized 
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and covered bonds, because they are issued by a dedicated entity with no previous 
trading or indebtedness - this entity would be protected from default, in short, be 
bankruptcy-remote. 
For this objective, an SPV – which could be governed by the private or public sector – 
acquires a maximized portfolio of government bonds from all euro area countries with 
market access in a fixed proportion (e.g. the weights could be derived from relative 
GDP or the ECB’s key capital). Against this portfolio as collateral, two tranches of a 
synthetic bond would be issued (Riet, 2017): i) A relatively large tranche of senior 
bonds (ESBies) with a senior claim on the cash-flow from this pool of government 
bonds and; ii) A relatively small tranche of European Junior Bonds (EJBies) with a 
junior claim on these payments. Losses on the SPV’s portfolio would be first borne by 
EJBies holders, leaving taxpayers save. The SPV would be able to generate a ‘risk-
free’ yield curve if ESBies were offered with a range of maturities (Riet, 2017).11 
Further designing issues are also considered. The first relates to possible ‘sub-
tranching’ in order to cater for different classes of investors. The junior bond could be 
sub-tranched into a first-loss ‘equity’ piece and a mezzanine tranche each catering to a 
different clientele: risk-averse investors, such as insurance companies and pensions 
funds would be attracted by the mezzanine tranche, whereas other specialized 
																																																								
11 Brunnermeir et al. (2016) propose a base case for the subordination level to be set 
at 30%, such that the junior tranche represents 30% and the senior one 70% of the 
underlying face value. For a worst case scenario – strong recession -, the simulation 
drawn by Brunnermeir et al. (2016) suggests that the subordination level would be 
sufficient to achieve a five-year expected loss rate on the junior tranche, comparable 
to those of bonds issued by peripheral countries; the five-year expected loss on the 
senior bond would in this case be slightly lower than that of the German bund.  
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investors – such as hedge funds – would prefer the first-loss piece (Brunnermeir et al., 
2016). The second special designing feature is that ESBIes are also ‘opened’ for the 
creation of a market for derivatives, and in particular CDSs (Brunnermeier et al. 2012 
and Riet, 2017). 
 
Contractual features of ESBies are also noteworthy. An important aspect relates to the 
obligations of the SBBS issuers: such obligations cover ‘all states of the world’ which 
distinguishes them from conventional sovereign bonds that typically define a fixed 
payment stream in every state of the world (ESRB, 2018, p. 17). As such, investors’ 
rights to receive payments result in this case from the contractually agreed priority of 
the payment waterfall (ESRB, 2018). On the other hand, contracts would provide for 
investors to agree with limited recourse and non-petition provisions, limiting their 
claims against the issuing entity to the assets secured in their favour (Idem, 2018). 
Finally, in the event of debt restructuring, sovereign bonds in SBBS pools must be 
treated similarly as those held by investors directly, ensuring a strong price 
relationship between the SBBS replicating portfolio and a diversified portfolio of 
sovereign bonds held directly (ESRB, 2018).12 
																																																								
12 A remaining aspect concerns the regulatory treatment of sovereign exposures. 
Under the current framework, SBBS would be treated as securitized products 
entailing subordination of credit risk. This means an unfavourable treatment in 
comparison to the underlying sovereign bonds: for banks and for insurance 
corporations (and pensions funds), holding a securitized product rather than the 
underlying portfolio gives rise to higher capital requirements (ESRB, 2018). So, if an 
enabling regulation for SBBS is adopted in the future, banks could hold senior SBBS 
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Let me now address two alternative proposals to ESBies. The first one points to the 
creation of E-bonds (Leandro and Zettelmeyer, 2018). These bonds would be issued 
by a supranational entity (to cover the financial needs of the euro area) and backed by 
a portfolio of senior claims towards these same countries. One referred advantage of 
E-bonds in comparison to ESBies is that safety would in this case be related to the 
intermediary itself and not to the specific tranche of the bonds issued by the 
intermediary (Lannoo and Thomadakis, 2019). Indeed, Zettelmeyer and Leandro 
(2019) clarify that these E-bonds imply ‘safety’ (they are covered bonds) but not 
‘tranching’ (so they are not a securitization instrument). 
The second proposal, from Acalin (2019), aims at implementing a new class of bonds 
that – in an innovative fashion – combines securitization with equity-type elements in 
the respective liability structure (that is, the indexation of the payoff structure to 
economic growth). An EDA (e.g. the ESM) would ensure coordination of the debt 
issuance in Europe. Each country would issue GDP indexed bonds up to 60% of their 
own GDP; above this threshold, countries would continue to issue individual 
traditional plain-vanilla bonds. On the assets side of the respective balance sheet, the 
EDA would hence buy GDP indexed bonds from euro area countries: the sovereign 
risk is not priced since the expected return of such bonds would be equal to the return 
of plain vanilla bond over the maturity of the bond. On the liability side, the EDA 
would then issue two kinds of bonds: a European safe asset (paying a fixed interest 
rate) and a European junior asset (paying a variable interest rate) (Acalin, 2019, p. 
79). The latter asset carries all GDP risk: if euro area growth is higher than that 
																																																																																																																																																														
(rather than sovereign bonds directly) to mitigate the impact of those changes in the 
regulatory treatment of sovereign exposures on bank capital requirements. 
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expected, then junior bonds will pay more, and the opposite occurs when GDP growth 
is lower than expected. 
 
Table 2 provides a comparison of ESBies with these two other examples of safe assets 
in the EMU, and also with typical securitization instruments (e.g. CDOs) used in 
private (debt) markets.  
 
 
 
Table 2 – SBBS vis-à-vis other EMU safe assets and typical securitization  
 
Designing features Typical 
securitization 
SBBS (EBies) E-bonds GDP indexed 
securities 
Originator  Banks (lenders) Sovereign 
creditors 
(including 
domestic 
banks) 
Idem Idem 
Securities issuing 
institution  
Banks 
Usually SPVs 
EDA (e.g. 
ESM) 
 
Idem 
 
Idem 
Pool of assets Claims against 
private agents 
Sovereign 
bonds issued 
by EMU 
member 
countries 
Idem 
 
Idem 
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Payoff structure Redistribution 
of the income 
stream from the 
underlying 
mortgage pool 
among bonds 
that differ (in 
principle) by the 
seniority of 
their claims. 
 
No equity-based 
elements or 
risk-sharing in 
the payoff 
structure.  
Redistribution 
of the income 
stream from the 
underlying debt 
pool among 
bonds that 
differ (in 
principle) by 
the seniority of 
their claims.  
 
No equity-
based elements 
or risk-sharing 
in the payoff 
structure. 
Redistribution 
of the income 
stream from 
the underlying 
debt pool but 
with no 
seniority 
structure. 
 
 
 
No equity-
based elements 
or risk-sharing 
in the payoff 
structure. 
 
 
Redistribution 
of the income 
stream from the 
underlying debt 
pool that differ 
by the seniority 
of their claims. 
 
 
 
 
Equity-based 
elements or 
risk-sharing in 
the payoff 
structure: junior 
tranches 
indexed to GDP 
growth. 
Seniority elements 
(e.g. through 
tranching) 
Not, for simple 
covered bonds. 
Yes, for 
structured 
instruments: 
CDOs. 
Yes. No. Yes. 
Possibility for 
derivatives 
Yes (e.g. CDSs) Yes (e.g. 
CDSs) 
Not explicit. Not explicit. 
Source: The Author (2019) 
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5.2. Applicability of the OTD model to SBBS and possible shortcomings of 
securitization in the sovereign debt market 
The same arguments that have sustained securitization in private (banking) markets 
should, apparently, be verified in the case of securitization of cash-flows associated 
with sovereign debts. Recall that the main argument in favour of securitization was 
the need to address maturity mismatch in the underlying debt markets and at the same 
time to ensure liquidity. Banks were able to put aside a number of loans from their 
balance sheet that could put pressure on their capital ratios without necessarily 
resolving all liquidity needs. The OTD model explains this relationship very well: 
banks as originators pool loans, and then tranche them and sell them via securitization 
(notably through SVPs).   
Securitization could also foster risk-sharing both geographically and functionally. In 
this latter case, this would be so because when compared to a single mortgage, an 
asset that is backed by a package of mortgages benefits from diversification of default 
risks across the different mortgages of the package (Hellwig, 2009). Securitization 
makes sense, because it uses a multiplicity of initial debts, and through packaging it 
ensures the dissemination and minimization of default risk. Ultimately, the resultant 
assets gain a life of their own (regardless of the compliance with the underlying debt 
contracts): as contractual obligations cover all states of the world, when issuers 
respect state-contingent obligations, default cannot in principle occur.   
The logic of the OTD model can be applied, ceteris paribus, to securitization of cash-
flows associated with sovereign debts. It is not a pure OTD model – as indeed it was 
not with regard to the MBSs market (supra) – and implies some adjustments. Firstly, 
the pool of debt loans is narrower than in the case of typical securitization 
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instruments: unlike the MBSs market, marked by a high multiplicity of underlying 
loans, the number of debts is here not as fragmented, since initial debtors are also in a 
more reduced number (coinciding with the sovereign debtors in the EMU) – this can 
affect the capacity for risk-sharing of the instrument itself. Secondly, although it is 
true that securitization on the sovereign debt markets is also meant to alleviate 
(domestic) bank balance sheets from (sovereign) debts that can show themselves to be 
non-performing - coping with the ‘doom-looping’ between sovereign and banking 
debts - the fact is that banks tend to keep some ‘skin in the game’. Recall that this was 
one of the problems with the business model of securitization prior to the subprime 
crisis: banks retained some skin in the game. The same happens here, even if for 
different reasons: the creation of European safe assets will not fully eliminate national 
government debt/bond markets. Thirdly, the minimization of default risk is not 
entirely guaranteed (as it was not, after all, in the subprime market): in the case of 
crisis yields in high risk assets becoming highly positively correlated reflecting the 
dynamics of contagion; simultaneously, as investors are looking for safe havens, the 
yields in the safe assets tend to decline (De Grauwe and Ji, 2018).13  Finally, 
securitization  - by ensuring pooling of assets and an equal treatment between 
creditors (including SBBS investors) – can after all prevent debt-restructuring 
processes, which for highly EMU indebted countries can become highly problematic 
in crisis situations (a new role for CACs is hence essential).  
The design of the SBBS should moreover consider additional problems that were 
present in the subprime crisis. Amongst those problems, worthy of highlighting are: i) 
																																																								
13 In extreme market events, the investor appetite for the junior tranche may dry up, 
affecting the interest for the asset as a whole (Lannoo and Thomadakis, 2019). 
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The erosion of the quality of collateral – the cash-flow related to the repayment of 
debt; ii) Statistical manipulation and the role of rating agencies; iii) The contractual 
obligations of the issuing entities – in many cases an SPV (as it is, in fact, the EDA in 
the SBBS proposal); iv) Non-transparent and complex processes of securitization 
(assessing the implications of eventual sub-tranching); v) The usage of swap 
instruments, in particular of OTC derivatives. 
 
6. Conclusions 
Safe assets can ensure – especially in normal times – an efficient functioning of the 
financial markets in the EMU and promote the pooling of risks in the sovereign debt 
market. They can, in such times, break the ‘doom-looping’ between sovereign and 
bank debts, offering the latter an alternative to sovereign assets.  
On more general grounds, euro safe assets may also play a role to cope with the so-
called ‘safety trap’ – a shortage of safe assets when monetary policy has reached the 
zero lower bound (Caballero and Fahri, 2014), apparently the current situation in 
EMU. The challenge is to promote the supply of safe assets outside the frontiers of 
monetary policy as a way to overcome the shortage of safe assets. In most of the 
proposals, the EDA in charge of issuing safe assets (e.g. the ESM) is a non-monetary 
policy agency. The EDA can indeed be at the frontier of a true fiscal institution in 
Europe.    
   
Despite these alleged benefits, the creation of safe assets involves some shortcomings. 
Once again, lessons from the subprime crisis should not be forgotten. Besides all the 
abovementioned problems, the subprime crisis revealed another, probably more 
significant, pervasive effect. In fact, securitization had not been capable of 
	 28	
eliminating the problem of housing mortgage loans (designed as mortgage loans with 
unconventional terms, e.g. adjustable interest rates) nor did it solve the problem of 
access to housing from lower income and weak households in the U.S.  
When admitting the transposition of securitization – ceteris paribus - to the sovereign 
debt markets in Europe, still facing important challenges especially in problematic 
countries (e.g. Greece, Portugal), the question is whether securitization can effectively 
help to overcome or to conceal the underlying problem of indebtedness and the 
structural problems (weak economic structures) that remain in those same countries. It 
is not ensured (despite the risk-sharing properties of the SBBS) that in a major crisis 
event a flight to national safe havens, freezing financing to those countries, is 
effectively prevented. If that flight happens, ‘low-income’ sovereign debtors will after 
all reveal their ‘subprime’ national debt.     
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